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Abstract
The practical success of the classical theories of colour vision, such as that of Young–Helmholtz when applied to the
measurement and reproduction of colour stimuli, and that of Hering’s in art and architecture, has overshadowed the fact that
neither theory achieved its main goal, namely to explain colour qualities. Neither the three types of cone, nor the first opponent
stages of neural processing in the retina and the lateral geniculate nucleus can serve as direct correlates to the perception of
elementary, or unique colours, such as red, green, yellow and blue. While our subjective experiences of these qualities do not
submit to measurement, physiological conditions that are required to perceive colours of a constant hue can be identified. For
instance, a constant ratio of responses of different types of opponent cells in the retina and the lateral geniculate nucleus of
primates may serve as a neurophysiological correlate of a constant hue. This is, however, not the correlate for seeing a particular
hue quality, say unique red. This latter correlate, if it exists as a separable entity, must be associated with yet unidentified,
higher-level neural activities. The fundamental problems encountered in relating colour qualities to neural activities are discussed
and references are made to the current debate about phenomenal consciousness. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Der ganzen modernen Weltanschauung liegt die
Ta¨uschung zugrunde, dass die sogenannten Naturge-
setze die Erkla¨rung der Naturerscheinungen seien... Es
gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt
sich...(Wittgenstein, 1971).
1. Introduction
Our understanding of the visual environment is
largely based on interpretations of perceptual qualities,
such as contrast, form, and movement. No such prop-
erty would be perceived were it not for the differences
in colour, or as James Clerk Maxwell (1872/1970)
wrote: ‘‘All ision is colour ision, for it is only by
obsering differences of colour that we distinguish the
forms of objects. I include differences of brightness or
shade among differences of colour ’’. These qualia belong
to the first realities of personal visual experience. Here,
Maxwell’s use of the word ‘colour’ in a general sense
that implies, for instance, that a rod-monochromat
distinguishes objects by means of achromatic colour.
Indeed, this is how their visual experience can be de-
scribed (Nordby, 1990; and personal communication).
One may, however, sometimes wonder about the link
between one’s conscious experience of colours, e.g. the
redness of an apple, and the physical stimulation of the
eye by light. Or perhaps, after having pondered the
problem a little more, one may find that it is more
appropriate to inquire into the relationship between the
experience of colour and the activation of nerve cells in
the visual system. Is there a causal relationship between
light, a particular physical property of the apple’s sur-
face, the intervening evoked neural activity, and my
perception of red? Are the same nerve cells activated
when, in my dream, I ‘see’ a beautiful bush of red roses
in the evening sunset? Or should we, because of the
explanatory gap — i.e. the problems of relating colour
qualities (qualia) to neural processes and physical prop-
erties in the same scientific language — talk not about
cause and effect, but rather of correlation, covariation
and structural correspondence?
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The visual impression ‘red’ is, like all colours, differ-
ent from the physical radiation and the surfaces that
bring it about (e.g. light reflected from the apple’s
surface). A surface with a certain spectral reflectance
can take on virtually any colour, less dependent on the
illumination and the reflected spectral distribution than
on the surround conditions and the adaptation of the
observer’s eye. These effects were well known in the last
century, and they were again called to our attention by
Edwin Land’s (1959, 1983) vivid demonstrations. The
same physical surface looks quite different when shown
in isolation in an otherwise dark laboratory than in a
normal visual environment. Also for this reason, a
particular colour can neither be correlated with nor
‘caused’ by the spectral composition of an isolated
patch, or even by the responses of the three cone types
excited by it. Only in well controlled laboratory experi-
ments is it possible to establish a correspondence like
that postulated by Helmholtz (1860/1911, p. 119; see
below).
At a first glance, the observation that colour percep-
tion is a conscious, subjective and qualitative experience
is less problematic. For those who regard consciousness
as a subject for scientific investigation, now is the time
to attack the problems of colour perception and qualia
by experimental methods (Crick, 1994). In Francis
Crick’s words (p. 9): ‘‘…the problem of qualia — for
example how to explain the redness of red… is a ery
thorny issue…. The problem springs from the fact that
the redness of red that I perceie so iidly cannot be
precisely communicated to another human being…. This
does not mean that, in the fullness of time, it may not be
possible to explain to you the neural correlate of your
seeing red. In other words, we may be able to say that
you perceie red if and only if certain neurones (and/or
molecules) in your head behae in a certain way ’’. If we
substitute ‘‘…you perceive red…’’ in the last sentence
by ‘‘you perceive the same quality (which we have
agreed to call red)’’, we see that such an explanation of
colour qualia is indirect. It relies on inferred neural
behaviour and on representations — on linking hy-
potheses — in a symbolic language. Crick’s proposal is
not concerned with qualia in itself (the redness of red),
but with physiological states leading to the same percept
in different situations. We thus recognise a fundamental
duality in this endeavour.
A large part of primate cerebral cortex is devoted to
processing information received from the retina, and
much progress has been made in elucidating the organ-
isation and function of visual cortex (Van Essen, Fell-
man, DeYoe, & Knierim, 1991). However, the various
aspects of subjective qualities are less well understood
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 1997). Colour perception
is well suited to bring forth the pertinent aspects of
qualities and conscious experience. Today, the study of
colour perception is closely tied to experimental psy-
chophysics and neuroscience, and even philosophical
reflections about this issue are submitted to rather
strong experimental constraints (Hardin, 1988; Thomp-
son, 1995; see also the discussions of Saunders & van
Brakel, 1997; Palmer, 1999). Presumably, a neuroscien-
tific program to Crick’s liking would search for collec-
tions of neurones in the retina, the geniculate nucleus
(LGN), and higher brain areas whose activities, in one
way or another, are correlated with the dimensions of
colour perception. One would record the activity of
these neurones when colour stimuli change along the
psychophysical dimensions luminance, waelength, and
purity, in the hope of finding links to the related
perceptive properties lightness/brightness, hue, and
colour strength (chroma). Even if it should be demon-
strated that a simple neural-perceptual parallelism or
isomorphism is too naive a hypothesis, such attempts
would give us useful overviews of the neural representa-
tions of different colour stimuli. This project would
reach completion once one had found correlates be-
tween the retinal image, and the neural activities ac-
companying the perceptual properties and physical
parameters (Valberg, Seim, Lee, & Tryti, 1986b; Val-
berg, Lee, & Tryti, 1987; Churchland & Sejnowski,
1992; Churchland, 1994; Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch,
1995). Examples of some correlates will be described
later in this paper. However, this program faces many
problems of a fundamental and practical nature. Let us
take a look at some of them.
2. The neuroscientific program and unique colours
The first problem that requires some careful thinking
is the aforementioned duality of the different perspec-
tives; such as first-person experience or introspection,
and objective observations of third-person behaviour.
This relationship obviously requires linking hypotheses
(Brindley, 1960; Weisstein, 1969; Teller & Pugh, 1983).
In the last century such hypotheses were often implicit
in theories of human vision, but in 1972 Horace Barlow
explicitly formulated a single-neurone doctrine for the
links between neural activity and perception (Barlow,
1972). His conclusion that the activity of single cells can
lead to subjective experience has become the most
influential in elucidating physiological mechanisms of
perception (Lee, 1991, 1999). Such linking hypotheses
must be tested by the consequences of their predictions.
It is therefore, in this context, illuminating to recapitu-
late ideas about neural units and unique colours that
were developed during the previous 200 years of colour
science.
In the years after Hermann von Helmholtz’s (1860/
1911 revival of Thomas Young’s hypothesis in his
‘Bakerian Lecture’ in 1801, colour perception was ex-
plained by light absorption in three types of cone
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photoreceptors, L, M, and S, in the human retina. The
spectral sensitivities of these cone types are shown in
Fig. 1. The belief (that we now know to be wrong) was
that three different classes of cone activated three basic
colour processes or sensations: red (L-cones), green
(M-cones), and violet or blue (S-cones). All other
colours were said to be due to the excitation of these
primary sensations in different proportions (the percep-
tion of yellow would for instance result from equal
stimulation of the ‘green-’ and the ‘red process’,
whereas white resulted from equal stimulation of all
three).
Helmholtz, (1860/1911, p. 119) writes: ‘‘Es gibt im
Auge drei Arten on Nerenfasern. Reizung der ersten
erregt die Empfindung des Rot, Reizung der zweiten die
des Gru¨n, Reizung der dritten die Emfindung des Violett ’’
(‘In the eye there are three types of nerve fibres. Stimu-
lation of the first one excites the sensation of red,
stimulation of the second the sensation of green, stimu-
lation of the third the sensation of violet’), and on p.
120 he continues ‘‘… (das Wesentliche in der Hypothese
on Young ist), dass die Farbemfindungen orgestellt
werden als zusammengesetzt aus drei oneinander oll-
sta¨ndig unabha¨ngigen Vorga¨ngen in der Nereensub-
stanz ’’. ‘… (the essence of Young’s hypothesis is) that
the sensations of colour are imagined as composed of
three mutually and completely independent processes in
the neural substrate’.
It is clear that Helmholtz here focuses on an explana-
tion of the qualitative aspect of colours. Ewald Hering
(1878/1964) vehemently opposed the Young–
Helmholtz theory, and he claimed that colour vision
was not based on three primary sensations, but on four
chromatic and two achromatic elementary, or unique,
colour perceptions (Urfarben) and their corresponding
physiological processes.
2.1. Unique colour qualities
In A Treatise on Painting Leonardo da Vinci (1651/
1906) had written that six particularly simple colours
are found in nature. They are the four unique, or
elementary chromatic hues, yellow, red, blue, and green
(Fig. 2A), together with the two achromatic colours
white and black. These colours serve as six qualitative
references in subjective or phenomenological colour
space (Hering (1878/1964), Hurvich, 1981). The physi-
cal stimuli associated with these percepts depend on the
viewing situation, and they vary from person to person.
Unique yellow, for instance, can be determined with an
extraordinary precision in the spectrum. Although one
person’s selected wavelength may be found anywhere
between 565 and 590 nm, the precision can be in the
order of a few nanometers (Richter, 1969; Mollon &
Jordan, 1997).
Unique yellow is characterised by it being ‘neither
reddish nor greenish ’. It is thus determined purely sub-
jectively by means of the other, neighbouring unique
hues on the hue circle. Unique blue satisfies the same
definition. The yellow–blue pair is opponent in that the
Fig. 1. The relative spectral sensitivity of three types of cone photoreceptors, L, M and S, in the human retina (Smith & Pokorny, 1975). The three
maxima are found in the greenish yellow, the yellowish green, and in the violet regions of the spectrum. The hues of the spectrum are only
approximately reproduced.
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Fig. 2. (A) Schematic representation of a symmetric hue circle with
the unique, or elementary hues: yellow (Y), red (R), blue (B), and
green (G). Binary hues can be scaled by the relative contributions of
two elementary hues. For example, an orange mid-way between red
and yellow is perceived as 50% red and 50% yellow; (B) The hue circle
of the Munsell-system, with 40 perceptually equal sensory hue steps.
With this scaling the elementary colours are not symmetrically posi-
tioned. There are, for instance, many more equal steps between blue
and red (12) than between red and yellow (8), and between blue and
green (12) than between green and yellow (8).
low sector. On a scale with forty equal hue steps, as in
the Munsell hue circle, the number of hue steps between
unique blue and unique red, and between unique blue
and unique green, is about 12. Between unique red and
unique yellow, and between unique green and unique
yellow, it is about eight (see Fig. 2B). This demon-
strates the incompatibility of the two principles of
arrangement.
In addition to the unique chromatic colours, it is
common to allow for other attributes of colour percep-
tion, such as hue, lightness, brightness, whiteness, satu-
ration, colour strength (chroma), blackness, lustre,
translucency, fluorence (the impression of fluorescence).
In a neuroscientific program, these attributes also re-
quire a neural representation, although possibly at a
level higher than the retina and the LGN.
2.2. The opponent theory of colour ision
In Hering’s opponent theory, two pairs of chromatic
unique colours, together with the achromatic pair,
black and white, were associated with three pairs of
hypothetical, antagonistic physiological processes. In
agreement with Hillebrand (1888, p. 70), he later came
to associate unique red with the breaking down, or
wearing out (‘Dissimilation’) of a particular ‘visual
substance’ — and unique green with the building up,
or restoration (‘Assimilation’), of the same substance.
Similar antagonistic processes in two other substances
gave rise to unique yellow and blue and to white and
black. The opposite nature of these paired hue quali-
ties, as displayed in the hue circle of Fig. 2A, were thus
associated with processes which mutually excluded one
another. The visual substances were not the photopig-
ments of the receptors; they were unidentified physio-
logical substrates at an unspecified level in the visual
pathway (Trendelenburg, 1943, p. 81). In this context, it
is of interest to note that G.E. Mu¨ller, in his zone
theory of colour vision, developed a more differentiated
view of the physiological processes underlying unique
hues. He reserved the primary antagonistic ‘neuronal
processes’ for explaining different aspects of colour
contrast (such as simultaneous and successive contrast,
induction, adaptation, etc.). With regard to unique
colours, he envisaged four ‘psychophysical excitations’
(obviously referring to Fechner’s (1860) ‘inner psycho-
physics’) at a central level that received their inputs
from the antagonistic neural processes (Mu¨ller, 1930).
Dorothea Jameson and Leo Hurvich’s extensive stud-
ies of the psychophysics of colour opponency in the
1950s were based on the above concepts of physiologi-
cal substrates, reviving Herings ideas through ‘hue can-
cellation’ experiments (see Hurvich, 1981). In these
experiments, additive colour mixtures were used to
determine a unique hue and the theoretical framework
implied that a neural mechanism was in an ‘equilibrium
two colour percepts mutually exclude one another. No
colour is seen as both yellowish and bluish at the same
time, in the way that purple can be said to be perceptu-
ally composed of blue and red. The same reasoning
applies to the ‘neither yellowish nor bluish ’ unique red–
green pair. These identifications seem to have little to
do with culture and language (see peer commentaries to
Saunders & van Brakel, 1997).
Following Leonardo and Hering’s concept, and with-
out any further preconception or theory, a simple geo-
metrical arrangement of hue qualities can be derived
using subjective scaling techniques. One example is the
symmetrical hue circle of the object colours of the
Natural Colour System (NCS; Miescher, 1948; Mi-
escher, Hoffmann, Weisenhorn, & Fru¨h, 1961) where
hues are scaled subjectively as proportions of the ele-
mentary hues yellow and red, red and blue, blue and
green, and green and yellow. This systematic arrange-
ment can, for instance, be visualised by a phenomeno-
logical hue circle consisting of four quadrants as in Fig.
2A. An interesting consequence of this orthogonal ar-
rangement of the NCS system is that the hue steps are
much larger in the red–blue sector than in the red–yel-
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state’ whenever an opponent mechanism had been bal-
anced. In this theory, unique yellow, for instance, is
viewed as an operational criterion for the brain being in
an equilibrium state between a ‘red process’ and a
‘green process’. However, the residual sensation need
not be relevant, since the judgements are based only on
the absence of redness and greenness, independent of
other colour attributes of the stimulus (it could also be
white or blue). This concept of hue cancellation goes
beyond the phenomenological approach of perceptual
scaling and arrangements that use unique hues as an-
chor qualities. Perceptually, it does not make sense to
say that the yellow (or white and blue) quality per se is
the equilibrium of red and green. It is simply ‘neither
greenish nor reddish’.
This idea of physiological ‘equilibrium states’ implied
‘mutually exclusive states’ of neural mechanisms. A
theoretical framework was thus introduced that bore a
close resemblance to Hering’s notion of assimilation
and dissimilation, and which easily lead to the idea of
opponent colours being related to excitation and inhibi-
tion of the same cell, analogous to annihilation of
excitation by inhibition, and vice versa. If green corre-
sponded to excitation, red would be the result of inhibi-
tion (DeValois, 1966, p. 67; Clark, 1993, p. 127).
However, the inhibitory range of opponent cells is
seldom more than 10–20 impulses/s (compared to sev-
eral hundred impulses/s for excitation) and therefore
much too small to represent the opposite colour.
Hence, ‘neutralisation’ of one colour by its opponent
cannot correspond to the balance between excitation
and inhibition of the same opponent cell type. More
than one type of neurone is required.
Actually, the data produced by cancellation experi-
ments are equivalent to those of other quantitative
psychophysical experiments using the mentioned ‘nei-
ther–nor criterion’ to determine unique hues. With the
help of linear colorimetric transformations both results
can be expressed in LMS cone excitation space, or CIE
XYZ colour coordinates, and thus serve equally well
for hypotheses and models about unique hues.
When the Swedish physiologist Gunnar Svaetichin
(1956) published the first recordings of spectrally de-
pendent positive and negative potentials in the retina of
fish, he believed he had proven Hering to be right.
Later, when Russell De Valois (1965) had already
found spectral activation and inhibition of cone oppo-
nent cells in the parvocellular layers of the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the macaque monkey,
these findings were looked upon as further confirma-
tions of Hering’s opponent theory in the primate. It
became common among neurophysiologists to use
colour terms when referring to opponent cells as in the
notations ‘red-ON cells’, ‘green-OFF cells’, +R–G
and +G–R cells (De Valois & Jones, 1961; De Valois,
1965; Wiesel & Hubel, 1966). In the debate, with hard-
core colorimetrists still clinging to the trichromatic
theory, some psychophysicists were happy to see what
they believed to be opponency confirmed at an objec-
tive, physiological level. Consequently, little hesitation
was shown in relating the unique and polar colour pairs
directly to cone opponency. Despite evidences to the
contrary (Valberg, 1971; Burns, Elsner, Pokorny, &
Smith, 1984), textbooks have, up to this day, repeated
the misconception of relating unique hue perception
directly to peripheral cone opponent processes. The
analogy with Hering’s hypothesis has been carried even
further so as to imply that each colour in the opponent
pair of unique colours could be identified with either
excitation or inhibition of one and the same type of
opponent cell. These are understandable misinterpreta-
tions in view of Hering’s postulate, and they will be
further discussed below. To better understand what
today appears to be an intellectual lapse, let us briefly
recapitulate what is now known about primate oppo-
nent cells.
2.3. The behaiour of a network of cone-opponent cells
The cone signals that are of importance for colour
vision are, via several steps, represented by cone-oppo-
nent retinal ganglion cells. These ganglion cells project
to opponent cells in the parvocellular and koniocellular
layers of the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and
from there to the primary visual cortex. Opponent cells
are particularly sensitive to differences in the activation
of cone classes, and consequently they code for wave-
length differences (De Valois, 1965; Wiesel & Hubel,
1966; DeMonasterio & Gouras, 1975; Derrington,
Krauskopf, & Lennie, 1984; Valberg, Lee, & Tigwell,
1986a; Valberg, Lee, & Tryti, 1987; Lee, Valberg, &
Tigwell, 1987; Lee, 1996). Let us imagine that we are
looking at a ‘red’ traffic light. An opponent, ‘L–M’ cell
would be strongly activated by this long-wavelength
light. Its signal is determined by the difference, N=
VL–VM, of the responses, V, of L- and M-cones, but
mainly because of intrinsic non-linearities in the polari-
sation, V, of the cone receptors, this response does not
increase in direct proportion to the luminance. Because
L-cones are excited by long-wavelength light and M-
cones by mid-spectral light, the result of looking at the
‘red’ traffic light is more excitation in L-cones than in
M-cones, and the response magnitude N=VL–VM of
the opponent cell becomes positive. As soon as the eye
is exposed to the ‘red light’, this ‘L–M’ cell will trans-
mit a train of electrical impulses up the optic nerve to
the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), the next station in
the brain. When the light shifts to ‘green’, this cell
immediately stops firing because of the strong inhibi-
tion from M-cones, giving a negative value of the
difference. The ‘green light’ activates ‘M–L’ cells, the
opposite cell type of ‘L–M’. In the case of achromatic
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white light and the ‘yellow’ traffic light (which is equiv-
alent to white for these cells), L- and M-cones are
excited about equally. They nearly cancel each other’s
input to an opponent cell, and the responses of both
‘L–M’ and ‘M–L’ cells to white or yellow of moderate
intensity will therefore be rather small, but not absent.
The ‘zero wavelength crossing’ is close to 570 nm,
provided adaptation is neutral.
The size and spatial structure of the stimulus and the
receptive field will influence a cell’s response. These are
difficult matters relating to unsolved problems of per-
ceptual completion. It may involve spatial propagation
of neural activity and filling-in processes (see Pessoa,
Thompson, & Noe¨, 1998). The cell behaviour com-
mented on here assumes stimuli that are large enough
to cover the entire classical receptive field (but see
Rodieck, 1991).
The use of colour names to label cone opponent cells
has lead to misunderstandings about the nature of
colour vision. To set things right, one should keep in
mind that primate ‘Green-OFF’ cells are, together with
‘Red-ON’ cells, both cone opponent cells of the ‘L–M’
type, and ‘Red-OFF’ and ‘Green-ON’ are both ‘M–L’
cells. The main difference between ON- and OFF-cells
is their relative weights of excitation (+ ) and inhibition
(− ) (Valberg, Lee, & Tigwell, 1986a; Valberg, Seim,
Lee, & Tryti, 1986b; Lee, Valberg, & Tigwell, 1987;
Zrenner & Gouras, 1993). In bright lights the two OFF
types are more strongly inhibited than the ONs, and
they therefore exhibit a weaker response to the addition
of an excitatory light. OFF-cells display a clear oppo-
nent response for darker colour stimuli than is the case
for the ON-cells (Valberg, Seim, Lee, & Tryti, 1986b).
ON- and OFF-cells are thus activated by different
ranges of luminance relative to an adaptation level;
ON-cells by the higher relative luminance and OFF-
cells by the lower. These two cell types work in concert
to include reflecting surfaces of object colours and
selfluminous surfaces of lights (related- and unrelated
colours). They may thus also contribute to the complex
perceptions of lightness and brightness. The strongly
inhibited OFF-cells are excited by light decrements, and
the ON-cells by increments (relative to a white adapta-
tion stimulus). I therefore suggest that, in the future, we
call them ‘L–M decrement-’, ‘L–M increment-’, ‘M–L
decrement-’ and ‘M–L increment’ cells, or DL–M, IL–M,
DM–L, and IM–L for short.
Even if the elementary hues today are accepted as
subjective references in phenomenal colour perception,
it is necessary to emphasise that no opponent-cell corre-
lates have been discovered. So far, all attempts to
determine the physiological nature of unique colours
have failed. According to Mollon and Jordan (1997)
they cannot be explained in terms of relative numbers
of excited L- and M-cones or their sensitivities (Ci-
cerone, 1990; Pokorny & Smith, 1977), nor by other
conceivable neural processes. In their recent review,
Mollon and Jordan (1997) illustrated the situation by
stating that ‘‘…if we understood the status of unique hues
we should probably understand something useful about
the general question of neural representation and its
relationship to conscious experience. For the present, the
nature of the unique hues remains mysterious and we do
not know whether they tell us anything about the neural
organisation of the isual system ’’.
2.4. Opponency reinterpreted
The consensus is emerging that the mere existence of
opponent cells — and the striking analogy of polarity
— cannot be regarded as proof of Hering’s theory, and
that the use of colour terms in referring to the re-
sponses of such cells is a misleading and loose terminol-
ogy (Abramov & Gordon, 1997). With regard to
opponent neurones, the idea of paired opponent pro-
cesses in ‘the same physiological substrate’ to explain
unique colours needs a reinterpretation. Opponent cells
exist in many species and at all levels of neural process-
ing in the primate; in the retina, in the geniculate
nucleus, and in visual cortex. Several explanations are
possible for why opponency is as universal as it seems
to be. For instance, it has been demonstrated, using
psychophysical techniques, that there are opponencies
in vision that serve other purposes than those postu-
lated by Hering. ‘Cardinal directions’, which are essen-
tially the directions in colour stimulus space
corresponding to a tritanopic confusion line, and L–M
opponency with constant S-cone excitation, have been
identified as two axes that are special with respect to
the sensitivity for chromatic detection, discrimination
and adaptation (Mollon & Polden, 1975; Krauskopf,
Williams, & Heeley, 1982). Some of these experiments
have been summarised by Thompson (1995, pp. 67–
71). In addition, theoretical considerations have demon-
strated that opponency is a strategy that can be used by
the nervous system to achieve an efficient transmission
of information from the retina to the brain. By sub-
tracting the response of one class of cone from that of
another, the information that is common to both —
and which is therefore redundant — is effectively re-
moved (Buchsbaum & Gottschalk, 1983). This reminds
us of the many examples of nature having selected a
sensory organ design that takes optimal advantage of
physical and mathematical principles. One is therefore
not surprised to find opponency between cone classes in
several channels that transmit signals from the retina to
the brain.
Despite such necessary modifications of the opponent
theory, it is still widely believed that Hering touched on
a fundamental truth when he postulated that colour
perception relies on physiological opponent processes.
It has, however, not yet been possible to track down the
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responsible mechanisms. It looks like cardinal direc-
tions and optimal transfer of information have little to
do with Hering’s unique hues, at least at the retina and
LGN. This points to the problems encountered when
looking for a simple ‘‘neural correlate for your seeing
red ’’, as Crick puts it.
Even if excitation and inhibition of the same cell type
can be dismissed as an explanation of colour oppo-
nency at the level of the LGN, one cannot exclude
neutralisation higher up in the system. This could hap-
pen by combinations (e.g. addition and subtraction) of
inputs from different opponent cell types, although
such an explanation also meets difficulties (Valberg et
al., 1986b). Results obtained from cortical recordings
are still equivocal, and therefore, to postulate that the
cortex is using such solutions is premature. One biolog-
ical advantage of different cell types projecting in paral-
lel to cells at a higher level, is that the identity of each
type and its information can be preserved.
The important lesson to be learned from this history
is that even if neural-perceptual isomorphism is a sim-
ple hypothesis and therefore also attractive, it is, for the
case in point, clearly not sufficient to bridge the gap
between neural processing and colour perception. Sim-
plicity of perception, or of its organised structure,
should not be taken to imply an equivalent simplicity of
the underlying neural basis.
This also illustrates the obvious problems that exist
with interpretations across the ‘explanatory gap’. There
are fundamental logical problems in the symbolic repre-
sentations of the qualitative experience that is to be
represented (e.g. redness as opposed to greenness), re-
gardless of whether the vehicle of representation is in
the form of neural firing patterns, in scientific symbol-
ism or in verbal, everyday language. This replacement
of our perceptions of the external world by symbols is
a price we pay in order to communicate (Farrell, 1962;
Wittgenstein, 1971).
In the neuroscientific program, correspondence be-
tween neural and perceptual structures must be demon-
strated convincingly in many different empirical tests,
charting as many stimulus dimensions as possible, be-
fore a particular linking hypothesis can be considered
plausible. This requires knowledge about what, exactly,
the relevant dimensions and attributes of colour percep-
tion are. An experimental neuroscientist must know
what to look for if neural activities are not to appear
utterly chaotic. He or she must, for instance, be aware
of the different modes of appearance (e.g. void- and
surface colours; achromatic and chromatic colours,
etc.) and the inner relationships and structures of per-
ceptual colour spaces. Neither should the biological
role of colours as natural codes or symbols (e.g. the
ripeness of fruit), as natural signals (e.g. for mating
birds), or even their aesthetic value be forgotten.
In this context, multiplexing of visual information is
an additional problem for the neuroscientific program,
particularly at the earlier levels of processing. Multi-
plexing means that the spatial arrangement of the exci-
tatory and inhibitory connections cause opponent cells
to respond not only to particular wavelength regions,
but also to stimulus size, changes of light intensity, the
position and movement of luminance contrasts, and
other properties of objects. Such multiplexing of func-
tionally relevant information in one cell, or in one
channel, means that cells at the lower levels cannot
distinguish size from the other parameters, like con-
trast, intensity, form, and colour. To arrive at useful
information, such properties must be separated out by
a comparison of responses of different cell types at later
stages. Since, in addition, perceiving all of an object’s
qualitative dimensions requires a conscious mind, one
may argue that the multiplexed information must be
sorted out as properties before they reach conscious-
ness, at a locus in the brain where the neural activity
forms the immediate substrate of perception (the
‘bridge locus’, Teller & Pugh, 1983). A practical prob-
lem has to do with localising the neural substrates and
the activity patterns that are required for a particular
perception. The notion that such autonomous process-
ing systems are also perceptive systems needs further
investigation (Zeki & Bartels, 1998).
After this historical expose´ I shall, in what follows,
briefly summarise what I consider to be relevant for
new attempts to cast light on the neuroscientific prob-
lem of unique colours. Recent knowledge about the
responses of primate opponent cells to colour stimuli
that are scaled subjectively in hue and chroma (colour
strength) indicates where some of the later adherents to
Hering’s theory went wrong. This analysis leads us to
the following conclusion: a neural correlate for your
seeing a particular colour (say unique red) has not yet
been found, but covariations with more abstract dimen-
sions of colour space, like a constant hue and a constant
chroma percept, have been proposed. This is an impor-
tant distinction that may serve as a clarification and a
constraint upon future colour vision hypotheses.
3. A representation of hues and chroma by opponent
cell responses
Shown in Fig. 3 are the relative responses of a
combination of the four common types of cone-oppo-
nent, parvocellular LGN-cells to the four unique hue
stimuli Y, R, B, and G of increasing chroma (denoted
5Y, 5R, 5PB, and 5G in the Munsell hue circle). For a
certain light adaptation, these stimuli correspond to the
unique hues as determined by human subjects. The
dashed ellipses represent the loci of colours of chroma
four and eight. Each opponent axis in Fig. 3 represents
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the response magnitude computed for one type of cone-
opponent cell. The response magnitude of ‘L–M’ cells
is plotted along the positive x-axis and the response of
‘M–S’ cells along the positive y-axis. ‘M–L’ cells are
represented by the negative x-axis, and ‘S–L’ cells by
the negative y-axis.
These cone combinations should not be regarded as
absolute. Quantitative simulations aimed at determin-
ing the cone inputs to opponent cells have demon-
strated a great deal of variation (Derrington et al.,
1984; Valberg, Lee, & Tigwell, 1987). For instance,
even the relatively simple L–M and M–L cells may
have additional weak S-cone inputs (DeMonasterio,
1984; Valberg, Tryti, & Lee, 1985). De Valois (1969)
used an S–L combination for his B-Y cells, and L–S
for the Y–B cells, whereas Wiesel and Hubel (1966)
concluded that the latter cell type received inputs from
M- and S-receptors. We have found a substantial num-
ber (between 3 and 4%; Valberg et al., 1986b) of
LGN-cells with clear M–S inputs that were, for a long
time, regarded as a missing link in opponent colour
theories (Gouras & Zrenner, 1981). This cell type has
not yet been identified morphologically. This, and other
uncertainties have opened for new speculations as to
how the dimensions of colour space should be ac-
counted for (Dacey, 1996; Calkins & Sterling, 1999).
However, the model of Fig. 3 incorporates basic
features found in many current models, even if it differs
in particulars. In order to simplify the computation, in
this paper the variability within each opponent cell type
has been dealt with by using data from cells that
represent typical averages of each type (Valberg et al.,
1986b). This is equivalent to narrowing the spectral
bandwidth of the ‘population response’ represented by
Fig. 3. An opponent response diagram: The four axes of this diagram represent the responses of the following four cone-opponent cell types;
‘M–S’ (IM–S), ‘L–M’ (IL–M and DL–M), ‘S–L’ (IS–L), and ‘M–L’ (IM–L and DM–L) of the lateral geniculate nucleus of the macaque monkey
(macaca fascicularis). The computed, combined responses to Munsell colour samples, covering the classical receptive fields of these cells are
plotted. The four unique stimuli (Y, R, B, and G) of increasing chroma are represented by coloured vanes radiating from the white point (W).
In a particular experimental situation, these and other constant hues are represented by a constant ratio of responses of two ‘orthogonal’,
opponent cell types. The coordinate axes (i.e. the ‘cardinal axes’) represent the Munsell binary hues 2.5GY, 5RP, 2.5P, and 10G (corresponding
loosely to the colour names greenish-yellow, purple, violet, and turquise). The dashed ellipses are the loci of colours of chroma 4 and 8. The data
are for medium lightness (Munsell Value 5) and adaptation to white projector light.
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each axis and is why the unique hues have been repre-
sented by fan-like distributions in the figure.
Several properties of Fig. 3 should be noted. The
centre of the coordinate axes represents ‘the white
responses’ (that need not be zero) for all cell types. This
magnitude has been subtracted from each response to
obtain a ‘pure chromatic response’. Excitatory response
is related to an increase in the magnitude of a certain
sensation whereas inhibitory response indicates less of
the same-, and not the opposite sensation (there is no
such thing as a negative firing rate). Because of a
relatively low maintained firing rate in primate LGN
opponent cells, one must assume that it is only the
degree of excitatory response above the maintained
discharge level (above a certain threshold) that consti-
tutes the positive colour (or chroma-) signal (Valberg &
Seim, 1983). Excitation of geniculate cells ranges be-
tween a maintained activity of less than 20 impulses/s,
to a maximum of about 500 impulses/s. The limited
dynamic range of inhibition, between 20 and 0 im-
pulses/s, provides a shorter range and fewer steps to
discriminate (but see De Valois & Jones, 1961, p. 198).
Cortical cells have lower maintained activity, and there-
fore the inhibitory range is even smaller.
It is immediately clear from Fig. 3 that the four
opponent LGN cell types, represented by the four
cardinal axes, cannot individually represent the unique
hues. Nor can unique hues be represented by opponent
cell types with a minor contribution from a third cone
type. However, constant unique hues, and all other
hues, can be approximated by a constant ratio of
opponent cells responses. It may come as a surprise
that unique red, for instance, falls nearly midway be-
tween the L–M and M–S axes. But it should be
remembered that Munsell 5R, Value 5, is a curved line
in the linear CIE (1986) diagram that, when extrapo-
lated, would cross the purple line at a complementary
wavelength of about 494c. A complementary wave-
length between 494 and 497c is usually what is found in
the laboratory for unique red when it is produced by a
mixture of short- and long-wavelength monochromatic
lights.
The chromatic stimuli that activate only one group of
opponent cells, without causing any differential excita-
tion in the other independent cell types, are not those
corresponding to unique hues. Rather, stimuli with
responses along the axes have binary hues; they have
colours that appear visually to be composed of two
unique hues. Changing the chroma of one of these
binary hues (e.g. a bluish red for the ‘L–M’ cell) would
lead to differentiated responses in only one of the
opponent cell types, whereas the M–S and S–L cell
types would react as if the stimulus were white. The
neural correlate to white (and other achromatic
colours) thus appears to be related somehow to nor-
malised responses in all opponent cell types. Likewise,
each hue — if it is of elementary or binary nature —
could depend on vector coding. It requires activation of
(at least) two separate opponent mechanisms. The non-
linearity consequently leads to the well-known Abney-
effect; i.e. to non-linearities in tristimulus colour space
that cause the constant hue loci to be reproduced as
curved lines in the CIE (x, y) chromaticity diagram
(Wyszecki & Stiles, 1982).
The Bezold–Bru¨cke phenomenon is another well-
known non-linearity that can be accounted for by
relative responses of opponent cell types. This phe-
nomenon characterises the change of hue that accom-
panies the increase of intensity of a monochromatic
light. For instance, a reddish 650 nm light and a
yellowish-green light of 550 nm both turn yellow as
luminance increases. This phenomenon too, can be
accounted for in terms of vector addition of responses
of opponent cells of different types. Because of non-lin-
earities their responses do not increase proportionally
with increasing luminance. For instance, in the case of
a 650 nm stimulus, the vector rotates counter-clockwise
in the response diagram of Fig. 3, in the direction
expected from the psychophysical experiments (Val-
berg, Lange-Malecki, & Seim, 1991).
The fact that unique hues are not represented by the
four axes may be a disappointment to many. Neverthe-
less, and not surprisingly, response ratios of cells are
important. A single hue with increasing chroma corre-
sponds to a straight line, radiating from the white
point, representing a constant ratio of the responses of
two neighbouring cell types. These results are in accor-
dance with psychophysical data which have demon-
strated that non-correspondence between cardinal axes
and unique hues is the rule (Valberg, 1971; Krauskopf,
Williams & Heeley, 1982; Burns et al., 1984; De Valois,
De Valois, Switkes, & Mahon, 1997).
Under other experimental conditions, with a different
adaptation or with a different surround, a unique red
percept, for instance, would be associated with another
wavelength or spectral composition. Despite this, there
is a theoretical possibility that the same local and
lateral feedback that contributes to colour constancy
would counteract adaptation changes in the receptors
and single cells — and thus provide for the same
response ratio whenever we see the same hue. To what
extent these opponent cells’ relative firing patterns are
linked only to the physical properties of the stimulus
projected onto their receptive fields, or are modified by
long-range interactions in the retina, as would be neces-
sary for ‘colour constancy’ to occur, we do not yet
know (Valberg, Lee, Tigwell, & Creutzfeldt, 1985).
However, if one believes that this kind of colour con-
stancy does not happen entirely at the retinal- and
geniculate levels (Land, Hubel, Livingstone, Perry, &
Burns, 1983), changing adaptation would lead to
unique red being represented by another vector.
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In a normalised viewing situation, there is a covaria-
tion of a specific response ratio of LGN-cells’ input to
visual cortex, with your perceiving a constant hue irre-
spective of chroma. Generally, however, we cannot
know which hue is associated with a particular ratio,
only that the hue stays the same as long as the ratio
does. The chroma scale of increasing colour strength
corresponds to equal increments along each hue vector
(but not the same increment for all vectors; see Fig. 3).
Theoretically, a general correlate to colour strength can
be approximated by a linear combination of the cardi-
nal axes (each representing the responses of one popu-
lation of opponent cells). After such a transformation,
equal hue steps approximate equal angles and equal
sensory differences become nearly equal geometrical
differences (Valberg et al., 1986b).
However attractive such a mathematical solution
might appear, nature might have adopted an alternative
strategy in primates. For instance, neurones tuned to
several chromatic directions other than the cardinal
axes have been found in primary visual cortex of pri-
mates (Lennie, Krauskopf, & Sclar, 1990) and beyond
(Kiper, Fenstemacher, & Gegenfurtner, 1997). The
unique hue directions do not seem to have a particular
status (Wachtler, personal communication). Also, the
circuitry of opponent cells with and without S-cone
inputs seems to be different. This may pose a problem
for the demultiplexing of different opponent signals to
achieve colour coding in the cytochrome oxidase
stained blobs in the cortex (Masland, 1996). These
intriguing findings indicate other, unexpected biological
solutions.
The neuroscientific program seems adequate for the
study of what brain activity is associated with mental
and perceptual activities, and great advances have been
made in these areas. However, our understanding of
subjective qualities is still scant (Gazzaniga, Ivry, &
Mangun, 1997), and neither do we have much knowl-
edge about colours and emotions.
4. Conclusion
In this minireview I have dealt with an old and
fundamental problem of colour perception, that has
recently acquired new importance in neuroscience and
in philosophy (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Church-
land, 1994; Crick, 1994; Saunders & van Brakel, 1997).
The structuring of colour perception imposed by the
unique hues does not seem to us today to have an
obvious physical or environmental cause. Neither do
these hues seem to have any behavioural importance,
except as qualitative references that ensure efficiency
and economy in the act of perceiving. Colour, like
other visual qualities, allows us to immediately discrim-
inate and recognise familiar objects without much time-
consuming analytical effort. This may be the advantage
they offer; once their relation to the physical world has
been learned. All kinds of qualia enable an immediate,
effortless organisation of a vast amount of information.
They are important for our orientation in a world that
would otherwise appear equivocal or chaotic. Colour
qualities thus lie at the very root of conscious vision.
There may be several stages of transformations of
neural signals before ‘the levels of conscious perception’
are reached — if, indeed, such distinct higher levels
really exist, except as abstractions of our minds. Psy-
chophysics, in the true meaning of the word, used to
consider the physiological processes in describing the
end product — the colour — as being caused by
stimulus parameters and linear combinations of cone
excitations (Schro¨dinger, 1925; Hurvich & Jameson,
1955). Obviously, conscious perception does not arise in
the photoreceptors. Beyond the retina it may well be
distributed over different levels of processing, and the
earlier levels may have a different role than the later
ones. The chromatic system is divided into different
opponent channels that, at a higher level, are compared
and recombined not only individually, but also with
achromatic and spatial information in the perception of
a generalised colour. Accepting this view leads to the
hypothesis of several subsystems (modules) and several
levels of integration that each is associated with some
kind of attribute (involving, at some stage, the other
senses as well). For form and object vision, we can
imagine a hierarchy of increasing complexity. Certain
abstract chromatic dimensions, such as hue and
chroma, may be accounted for at the earliest stages of
LGN-inputs to area V1. Here, or later, the firing rates
are compared and combined to arrive at the relevant
attributes. Entities such as lightness, brightness, con-
tours, forms, depths, movements, etc. must also be
given a neural representation to allow the perception of
complex scenes of objects in a given temporal and
spatial context.
The perceptions of light and colours (qualia) are
immediately given to us, whereas our understanding —
the science of light and colours — deals with represen-
tations; signs, symbols, concepts, logic, language and
other mental constructs that have a long history. Their
comprehension requires long experimental training and
a thorough theoretical education. On this background,
it is difficult to see how to deal scientifically with
Chalmers’ hard problem of qualia, i.e. the ‘redness of
red’ or the perception of unique colour qualities
(Chalmers, 1995a,b). How can qualia be studied sepa-
rately from a representation, be it by neural correlates
and/or by a symbolic, scientific language? Natural sci-
ence can describe the physical and physiological condi-
tions under which we see colours, and the difference
between them, by referring to biophysical states of a
complex system. This is probably all one can expect
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from an exact scientific method. Even if we can specify
the many different physical and neural conditions that
normally lead to a red percept, we cannot explain why
we experience redness rather than some other quality.
What we can strive for scientifically, is to give an
account of the physical and physiological conditions
that give rise to the same perceptual attributes; i.e.
when a property of a colour stimulus in one condition
matches the same quality in another (e.g. hue). Fig. 3,
for example, does not depend on a specific neural
doctrine; it simply maps unique colours that were deter-
mined by human subjects onto an opponent response
diagram.
A combination of personal experience, psychophysi-
cal and neurophysiological methods, together with
quantitative modelling, will bring us closer to an under-
standing of the processes involved and reveal new limits
of such endeavours and the associated linking hypothe-
ses. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge the funda-
mental limitations imposed by the scientific method in
dealing with such problems.
It appears to be easier to represent equalities (colour
matches) and differences (detection and discrimination)
than perceptual qualities (contents of conscious experi-
ence). Scaling of colour differences lend themselves to a
simplified geometrical representation (Valberg et al.,
1986b), but in Fig. 3 the mutual exclusiveness of unique
red and green, and of unique yellow and blue has not
found a simple geometrical counterpart. Thus, cardinal
directions seem to account for variations in chromatic
thresholds and colour discrimination, but unique hues
are still without a unitary neural representation, and
their physiological origin remains enigmatic. The argu-
ment could be made, of course, that the reason for our
bewilderment about colour qualities, and particularly
about the unique hues, is that monkeys are different
from the human primate, or because neurones in anaes-
thetised animals respond differently from those in wake
ones. The first objection is hard to maintain, consider-
ing the many demonstrations of psycho-physiological
similarities of colour vision in primates. Except at the
peripheral levels, the second argument may, however,
be relevant.
In conclusion, one cannot come much closer to ex-
plaining colour qualities (the hard problem), than to
use a precise scientific language to point at the physical
and physiological circumstances that are required for
their appearance. Each one of us carries with him a
subjective colour space with its unique hue references.
This space is mapped onto a stimulus space (and onto
the neural activities of low-level opponent cells) in an
ever changing relationship, depending on adaptation,
surround conditions, etc. Subjective colour space itself
is thus no more relative than objective stimulus space
— only the relationship between the two is continu-
ously shifting. Experimental studies in perception and
neuroscience in the new millennium will hopefully clar-
ify these relationships.
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